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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ORSON LEWIS, doing business as 
LEWIS BROTHERS STAGES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 7311 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The fundamental facts in this case are not in dispute 
and plaintiff's Statement of Facts, as outlined in its 
brief, is substantially correct and the material parts 
thereof are adopted by the defendant for the purpose 
of this case. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
· '1. · As: pointed out by the plaintiff, the major is_sue 
in this case is a judicial construction of Title 80, Chapter 
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15, Section 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which imposes 
a tax equivalent to two per cent of the amount :paid "(1) 
to common carriers * * * as defined by Section 76-2-1 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, * * * for all transpor-
tation * * * provided, that said tax shall not apply t-.1 
* * * street railway fares * * *. '' 
2. Whether the Tax Commission did in fact construe 
the Kearns operation of Lewis Brothers Stages as being 
within the ~esignated exemption. 
3. If the court finds that such construction did in 
fact exist, whether such construction of the statute is 
correct. 
We will discu_ss these three questions chronologically 
as outlined by plaintiff in its brief under plaintiff's 
Statement of Errors. 
1. The exemption created by the Legislature was 
intended to cover situations such as the Kearns operation. 
2. The exemption has --been previously liberally con-
. strued ·by the Utah Supreme Court and the State Tax 
Commission. 
3. The Kearns operation complies with the valid 
tests now being applied by the State Tax Commission 
as outlined in Exhibit A. 
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REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
I. 
The exemption created by the Legislature was intended 
to cover situations such as the Kearns operation. 
In discussing this question raised· by !plaintiff, it is 
subnlitted that the only question to be determined is 
the proper definition of the ter1n ''street railway fares.'' 
Plaintiff cites portions of the Utah Supreme Court Case, 
[Jtah Light and TTaction Company v. State T,ax Com-
n~ission of Utah, 92 Utah 404, 68 Pac. ~d 759, in support 
of plaintiff's position that the exemption of "street rail-
'"ay fares'' was intended to cover situations', such as 
the !(earns operation. Plain tiff has a;~pparen tly read the 
la-\v as set forth in the Utah Light and Traction Company 
case and makes the novel assertion· that ''the Kearns 
operation was only an integral part of an emergency 
street transportation system in ·and· about Salt Lake 
City." (Plaintiff's Brief, P. 10) and further, "It must 
hP recognized that it '\vas only an extension of a street 
transportation service during a war 'emergency which 
the traction company' lacked facilities'to make.'' (Plain-
tiff's Brief, ~- 11) Plaintiff cites no case, and indeed 
it is believed none can . be found, to support such con-
tention. There is no assertion, nor is there any evidence 
in the record, which would indicate that Plaintiff's 
l(Parns operation had anything at all to do with the 
operation of the Salt Lake City Lines. 
This court, in deciding the Utah Light and Traction 
Company Case said 
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4 
''Scrutiny of the, language of the statute leads 
to the same result. ln Section 4 (b), the tax is 
imposed as follows: ""*A tax equivalent to two (2) 
per cent of 'the amount'- paid:·,~ (1} To' common 
carriers,· ·e>r telephone· or- telegraph· corporations 
as defined by Section 76-2~1 of the Revised 
Statutes- of Utah, 1933,' _to which is added the 
proviso that such tax is ... hot to ap·ply to 'street 
·railway fares.' Turning to section 76-2-1, we find 
· the definition:. of common carriers 'includes every 
H,.... . r_aprq~<:}. corjporation; st!eet railrqad corporation; 
• * * engaged in the transportation 'of persons or, 
. i .·.' trroperty fot public service over regular routes 
·! · ~, .... between points within thiS' state.' ·Subdivision 14 . 
. In the same s-ection, the term 'street railroad' is 
~·' . ,.qefined ~s ~nclud~g 'ev.~ry railway, and each and 
every brancli or extension thereof, by "rhatsoever 
• ~H·, ' power operated, being mainly upon, along, above 
or below any street, * * * within any city or town,' 
etc. Subdivision 7. It would seem to _follow that 
when the phrase, ~street railway fares,' was used 
the legislative-intent was· ·that such language had 
reference· tO: the ·fares· paid• on~: evety 'street rail: 
way,· 'and each and every branch or extension 
thereof,_ by whatsoever power operated.' 11his 
la.nguage negativ-es the idea of an intent-ion to 
classify or discriminate against the users of 
mot·orbuses or trolley co·aches ·and- to favor the 
_ : riders of street ca.rs pa·rt.icularly where, as in 
-ptlai.ntiff's case, the street car lines, bus lines arnd 
trolley route~ .are necess(JrY.-Pf!;rts of an integrated 
street railway system .. '' (~talics supplied.) 
and further : 
.... , •. ...<. • 
' -
''The trolley coach and motorbus substitutions 
in place of street cars on rails or as an extension 
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of the rail system are ordinarily considered as 
being within the scope of street rail,vay service 
and systems or auxiliary thereto. City of 
Columbia v. Tatum, 17 4 S. C. 366, 177 S. E. 541; 
Russell v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 231 Ky. 820, 
22 S. W. (2d) 289, 66 A. L. R. 1238; Anderson v. 
Knoxville Power & Light Co., 16 Tenn. App. 259, 
64 S. \V. (2d) 204." . 
It is not for counsel to suggest to this court what 
interpretation should be placed Ujpon the quotations from 
the Utah Light and Traction Comp~any case. However, 
it would appear from a reading of the· entire case that 
the Tax Commission erroneously required the Traction 
Company to report trolley coach and motorbus fares 
"Thile exempting fares paid by streetear riders within 
the same integral street railway system. It is, therefore, 
submitted that in order for a transportation system to 
qualify under the exemption of ''street railway fares'' 
the motorbuses or trolley coaches operating within the 
system must be an extension or branch of a street rail-
way system. 
This court in two other cases has considered what 
constitutes a street railway. The first case decided was 
[Jtah Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City et al, 58 
Pac. 2d 1, 89 Utah 54'6 (1936). In this case the plaintiff 
sought a \vrit of prohibition prohibiting the defendant 
city from purchasing and operating motorbuses as a 
common carrier within the city of Ogden. Prior to that 
time the ·plaintiff had been operating a street railway 
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within the limits of Og .. den City and then began using 
motorbuses in conne~tion therewith.- The sole question 
in the case ·was whether or: not the city- had authority to 
own and operate buses within the city for the purpose 
of transporting passengers: The· statutes of Utah per-
mitted the city to maintain and·· operate a streef rail"way. 
The contention of the defendant was that the purpose 
of such· grant of power to n1unicipalities to operate 
street railways was to enable thern to furnish transpor-
tation over the streets and the means employed to that 
end were largely_ in their discretion. The court clearly 
held that the authority to op~erate a street railway does 
~ot imply aut~ority to operate motorbuses. The court 
said: 
'' * * * but to say that the former means of 
transportation (street railway) fairly includes 
the latter (operation of motorbuses) is to extend 
the imtport of the word ''railway'' far beyond its 
Ir1eaning. '' 
The court quoted from the case of Simoneau 'I.". 
Pacific Electric Railroad Co., 159 Cal. 494, 115 Pac. 320. 
323, wherein that court quoted from the case of Hannah 
v. Metrop. St. R. Co.', 81 Mo. :App. '78, 79 as follows: 
" 'A street railway' has been variously defined. 
As the name indicates, the primary meaning of 
'street railway', or 'street railroad' is one 
constructed and operated on and along the streets 
of· a city or town for the carriage of persons from 
one point to another in such city or town or to 
and from its suburbs." 
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The Utah Supreme Court \Yent on to say·:'~·· ·-
I I I ~ r 
"A street railway is such' rega-rdless· of· the 
... mO-tive power used~··*,* *.While no particular mo-
tiv.e po"reri ~n,4 no Jlai:tiG"l~r lo~~~ion ,alo:p.g , ~he 
street is an essential characteristic of a street 
rail"'"ay, yet a way or road without rails is· not ·a, 
railway or railroad. * :~~:: * No case has been ·called 
to our attention and we .have been unable .. to find 
a case in which a motorbus line not run q~ rail.s 
has been held to be a street railway.'' 
. I~ fact, the Utah Court said the contrary was held 
~- . " .. -. r , ~ ... , " -.- -· 
to be the case in Woodward v. City of Seattle, 140 W.a.sh . 
., . ; - . ~ . . . - - ' ~ ~ . - . 
83, 248 P. 73, 75. In that case Seattle owned a street 
railway. system. It acquired a b~s, and while operat~n_;g 
the sam~ in connecti~n with .th_eir ~tr~~t. rai~way a pa~­
seng~r was i!ljured by negligence o~ -~~e bus ~riv~F· An 
action was _brought against the city and the court held 
' \... . 
that notwithstanding the city had the authority to oper-
.... I' ., •,J 
ate a street railway it was witho~t auth_ority to oper~te 
motorbuses. In its decision the court said: 
"The power granted by statute is restricted 
to railways; and to say that the term 'railways' 
may be construed to include motorbuses and 
motorbus routes is to say that the term also 
includes all manner of transportation, including 
that by water and air. It is common knowledge 
that for many years street railway systems have 
been operated without the operation of motor-
buses in connection, and this is conclusive that 
such operation is not indisrpensable. '' 
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From the statement of the Supreme Court of the 
-State of Utah in the above case and from the decisions 
which it favorably quotes, there is little doubt that the 
law in Utah must be considered to be that the ter1n 
''street railway'' cannot include, at least ordinarily, 
motorbus trans:portation or ·-any other form of trans-
portation not ~un on rails, or at least a basic street 
railway ·system which includes an extension or branches 
on which trolley coaches or motorbus substitutions 1n 
the place of streetcars on rails are ·being· utilized. 
The second Utah ·case was Utah Light d!; Tractio,-~ 
Company v. Public Service Commission, 101 Ut. 99, 118 
Pac. 2d 683. The salient facts pertinent to our problem 
are that the ·plaintiff brought an- action for the revoca-
tion of the order of the defendant issuing a certificate 
of conveniehce and necessity to·- the Airway Motor 
Coach Lines as a common carrier between Salt Lake 
City and ·-nine smaller communities· in the South end 
of Salt- Lake> County. 
One of the contentions made by the plaintiff was that 
the Commission's order was contrary to law for the 
reason that the statutes· required- the application for ~t 
certificate of- convenience and necessity to show that 
the applicant had received the require~ consent, franchise 
_ or permit of the proper county, city, municipal or other 
-:public authority before he could secure a certificate of 
-conveni~nce and necessity.- The plaintiff asserted that 
Airway Motor. Coach Lines had no such franchise. For 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
that reason the issua.;nce of the cer~iftcate \w~s contrary 
to .law. rrhe Supreme Court dealt ·with this .~.<?n.tention 
by saying that a ~ity or municipal corporation_ had not 
authority under the statutes of .t,heL st~te of, "{Jtah to 
grant or require an automobile corporation to have a 
local franchise to .eD:gag~ .in business, ~houg4 the statutes 
·permit the1n to grant a franchi~e to a street railway 
company. The court states in ve;ry clear~ lang'\lage: 
. ' ...... : ... 
''That ·an automobile corporation such as this 
(Airway-Motor Coach Lines) is not a street rail-
way was held in Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden, 
· 89· Utah 546." 
. . - , . . ._. . ,;.•. . ; ,. ' , I 
For this and other reasons the order of the Public 
.• . . • . i . - •\ ·: )"• .. J . - ; 
Service Commissi~n ~as ~~-~irmed. _9~ns~qu~~~ly, ~t seems 
clear that Lewis Brothers Stages cannot claim to be a 
street ra~lway. In adqition to th.is, in :View· of t~e Utah 
- · · · · -- -· , ~ _. 1 ..:. -· .- , r :- · =. ~ _,-
Rapid Transit i· Company ca~_e, it. wou~d. see:q~._ almost 
I . ., ', ~ • ! I ' .: ! ! \ _j !. • • .!,. -
\Yithout _que_stion that the ter~ street. r~i~~~y ~ay not 
be extended to include motorbus lines though such lines 
operate in e~sentially the same ·manner as a street 
~ailway. 
•; 
. . ~~ . . - . _.; 
In considering what the characteristics · of a street 
rail,vay consist of, the following brief -quotadons would 
seem helpful: 
. "j ' ' 
( 1) "The right to lay rails· in a· public street 
is the distinguishing featu:r.e of a street railway.'' 
(Atlantic -City and S. R. !Co. v. State Board of 
Assessors, 96 Atlantic 568, 571) 
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(2) "Street railways ,are only such as are 
authorized to occupy and use the streets of a city 
or town under franchise from the munjcipality. '' 
- . (Lewis V'. Omaha and C. B. 8. Ry. Co., Iowa, 138 
N.W. 1092, 1094) 
( 3) ''A street railway is intended merely for 
_, ~t· local ·convenience and to facilitate travel fro1n 
. 
I 
! p·, .. 
po.ilnt to v~oint within the munic.ipality, or suburban 
district and immediately adjacent thereto." 
( H.artzell v. Alton, Grante and St. Lowis Traction 
Co., 104 N~E." 1080, 10811, 263 Ill. 205) 
( 4) '' The fundamental purpose of a street 
railway is to accommo-date street trav-el, and not 
to travel to or from points beyond the city's 
· lines." ('City of Aurora v. Elgin, A. & S. Traction 
Co., 81 N.E. 544; 1547, 227 Ill. 485) 
( 5) "Street railways are * * * to enable 
inhabitants of municipalities to pass from one 
· · portion: o,f' their territory to another and to stop 
at frequent and convenient points according to 
. the regulations of the company.'' (Sparks v. 
Phila, and C. R. Co., 61 A. 881, ~82, 212 Pa. 105) 
(6) "The tracks for a street rail,vay are 
ordinarily laid to conform to street grades. Its 
cars run at short intervals, stopping at street 
crossings to take . on and let off passengers and 
not freight .. '' (Hannah v. Metrop. St. R. Co., 81 
Mo. A:pp. 78, 82, citing Williams v. City Elec. Ry. 
Co., 41 F. 556) 
. (7) . "Further., distinction is made .in the case 
of Hartzell v. Alton, Granite and St. Louis Trac-
tions Co. previou~ly cited. Therein the courts 
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state that the law makes a clear distinction be-
tween a street railroad and a railroad. A street 
railroad is a railroad laid down on streets of a 
town or city for purpose of ca-rry·ing passengers 
from one point to another in the city or to and 
fro nz its suburbs, but a railroad runs across coun-
try carrying both passengers rand freight and 
takes on the character· of a co1nmercial railroad. 
(Italics supplied.) These cases are amply sup-
ported by many others holding similarly. 
The court in the Utah Light and Traction Company 
rase and plaintiff in its brief on page 12 indicate that in 
detern1ining this matter \\e must look not to the letter 
of the statute, but rather to the intent of the Legislature. 
The Inost that can be said with regard to the intention 
of the Legislature is as Judge Wolfe pointed out in his 
concurring opinion in the traction company case that 
''the Legislature did use the term 'street railway' here 
to mean street transportation system.'' We submit that 
no broader interpretation should be given to street trans-
portation system than is given in the traction company 
f'ase and that, if a street transportation system is to 
be exempt from the collection of sales tax on their fares, 
there must be at least partial compliance with the defini-
tion of comn1on carrier as set forth in Title 76-2-:1, 
ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
To now ,question what the Legislature n1eant by 
street railway fares is purely speculative and \Ve believe 
that the best indication of what the Legislature intended 
iR \Vhat the Legislature said. Counsel has cited no case 
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and we have been unable to find one single case in \vhich 
the words ,,, street railway'' are construed to mean a bus 
transportation system or ·any other type of transporta-
tion system except one which is operated on rails. To 
hold that the plaintiff in this case is not subject to this 
tax would be to entirely nullify the statute imposing 
the tax on common carriers. If Lewis Brothers -StageH 
be exe1npt from the sales tax, considering their mode of 
operation, then we would submit that every transporta-
tion co1n·pany operating in the state of Utah is also 
exempt .. 
Several portions of the ~ecord should be specifically 
consulted with regard to this question. r~rhe testimony 
?f Mr. Hacking, Chairman of the Public Service Commis-
sion, with regard to the operations of Lewis BrotherR 
St~ges indicate~ conclusively that Lewis Brothers Stages 
had no authority to operate a transportation syste1n 
vvhich could possibly be construed as ''street raih:ray. '' 
(R. 32-42) This testimony indicates that the Le:'Tis 
Brothers Stages could pick up ;passengers at any place 
--~ 
on the ·Out-bound trip but could not discharge on-~the 
out-bound trip, and likewise the Lewis Brothers Stages 
could pick up ·passengers on the in-bound trip but could 
not discharge passengers along the route until reachin~ 
Salt Lake City. 
In response to question by counsel as to whether 
Le\vis Brothers Stages had any certificate -of convenience 
and necessity allowing them to pick up and discharge 
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13 
passengers 'Yi thin the n1etropoli tan area of Salt Lake 
City, ~lr. Hacking ans"~ered: ''They have no such cer-· 
tifieate: never have had to my knowledge.'' ( R. 41) To 
the san1e effect ~Ir. Orson Lewis testified on cross exami-
nation as follo,vs: 
Q. "~Ir. Lewis, you testified you picked up 
and let off passengers between your terminal, 
Salt Lake and Kearns; where did you pick U[p the 
passengers J? 
A. "Any place on our route. 
Q. ''And on your out-bound trip, where did 
you let them off! 
A. '' 33rd South. 
.;•. 
Q. "That is the first let off' 
,., 
A. "Yes." (R. 62) . 
We submit that, in view of this and other testimony, 
Lewis Brothers Stages wholly fails to meet the fourth 
test used by the C·ommission which provides '' ( 4) Fre-
quency of stops to pick up and deposit passengers along 
streets of a city and suburban areas." (Italics supplied.) 
One other principle which we feel must be considered 
in eonstr11ing this particplar section is that a_nnounced 
by this court in the case of ~orville v. State.Tax Com-
u~ission, 98 Utah 170, 97 Pac. 2d 937, wherein the court 
held "But, likewise, statutes exempting taxpayers from 
. I 
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a general taxing statute are construed strictly against 
those seeking to escape the tax burden.'' Stillrnan v. 
Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A. L. R. 552; Parker 
v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961; In re Steehler' s 
Estate, supra; 25 R.C.L. Sec. 309, at p. 1093. 
As we view this case the plaintiff is clairning to he 
exempt from a general taxing statute and it is our con-
tention that the exemption of street railway fares is an 
exemption from a general taxing statute and is to be 
strictly construed against the plaintiff. 
II. 
The exemption has previously been liberally construed 
by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Tax Com-
ntission. 
This sect~on of plain tiff's brief urges u;pon the court 
that there has been an administrative construction by the 
Tax Commission which, in considering cases of this kind, 
should exempt the Lewis Brothers Stages from the pay-
nlent of this tax. We submit the fact to be that the 
record will not sustain the position of the plaintiff; that 
there has never been any administrative construction 
of this particular exem'ption, i.e., ''street railway fares.'' 
True it is that the testimony of Mr. Shields (R. 48-53) 
indicates that in representing the plaintiff at that time, 
Mr. Shields had some discussion with rnembers of the 
Tax Commission concerning the general problem of the 
sales tax and the conduct of the Le,vis Brothers Kearns 
operation. \Ve submit that, accepting l\1r. Shields' 
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15 
te~timony at its face value, this does not establish an 
administratiYe construction "~ith regard to the f)xemp-
tion herein inYolYed. Mr. Shield's testimony (R. 50) 
indicates that ~lr. Bennion's i1npression of the !(earns 
operation "Tas that it "'"as in the nature of a streetcar 
business. :Jf r. Shields testified as follows : 
"So I came up to the Capitol tpe next morning, 
and I talked to Mr. Bennion, and it seems to me 
he was in this room (indicating), right here in 
a little room, as I remember, and I talked to him 
about it, and he said: 'That is going to be just 
an in-and-out business, if what they tell us is s·o. 
There will be several thousand soldiers out there, 
and the Government is opposed to a tax on them. 
They claim it is in the nature of a street-car busi-
ness, and everybody is trying, the Chamber of 
Commerce here are trying to save the soldiers' 
expenses wherever it can be· done, and make it as 
comfortable for them as it can be,' and he said, 
'I think you are perfectly alright.'' 
''r e also :point out in this eonnection that the testi.:. 
n1ony of Mr. J. Lambert Gibson (R. 25-32) and the testi-
mony of ~Ir. Bennion (R. 42-45) indicates. that neither 
of these t"vo commissioners have any present recollection 
of having considered the matter of the exen1ption from 
the sales tax of Lewis Brothers Stages. One of the great 
difficulties "~hen considering the administrative construc-
struction of the statute by an administrative body, par-
t~cularly where such administrative construction rests 
npon ''"erbal conversations, is that it cannot be ascer-
tained \Yith any degree of certainty as to exactly what 
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m~tters the. allege<f. conyers~.tio;n~ c_on~a~n,ed .. This diffi-
culty is part~cularly e~em,plifi~rd.. by th,e . te~_t_imOP:Y of 
Mr. Leonard Amodt (R. 54-56). Mr. Amoqt. ~estified 
having talked to Mr. Barney, one of the auditors of the 
S~ate . Ta.x Comwi.~~iqn, E;tnd t~stified as follows: 
_, ! ~ ~ l t~. j-_, \ ; 
Q. "You remember at the instigation of this 
Kearns line, Mr. Orson Lewis informed you that 
you would have to compute the sales taxes on the 
fares, but apparently you ·hadlsome doubt about 
this, or wanted to make a further check, ~and you 
called. Mr. Barney .whom you knew qpite well, as 
he was an auditor of the Tax Commission at that 
time~ 
A. ''Yes, t.ha t is right. 
Q. ''In substance, in your conversation, did 
he state that under the circumst~ances which you 
outlined he doubted "\vhether the sales tax should , 
be chatged by you; it "ras his impression that it 
shouldn't be charged~ 
I ' & ,·.·; ··l 
A. '.' Tha~ wa.s·. 4is qpi:n:fq;n. . . , . [ ... ;; . ·. , . 
. . 
Q. "Something to that' effect~ · 
A. ''Yes, that \Vas his opinion. '' 
~1r: Amodt further testified· on cross-examination of 
counsel for the Tax Commission·as follows: (R. 55) 
Q. ''Mr. Amodt, you say that Mr. Barney 
told you that under the circumstances as outlined 
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no sales tax applied. Do you recall what circum-
stances you outlined to him' 
A. ''I called ]\tfr. B~arney· on the ·telephone, 
on my phone one night, and eX'plained our opera-
tion to Kearns. -
Q. ''Do you recall what you said~ 
Q. "Do you recall what you said~ 
A. ''I explained the operation, saying 'We 
are operating a bus. system similar to Salt Lake 
City Lines.' There was no detail about it. As .long 
as I called him, I didn't want it to go on record; 
but I did call, and explained to him our operation. 
(Italics added.) 
Q. "You indicated to him it was similar to 
Salt Lake City Lines~ 
A. ''Yes. I told him passengers were picked 
up and let off at different points.'' 
It can be seen readily from this testimony that the 
impression of the nature of the plaintiff's Kearns opera-
tion held both by the Tax Commission and by Mr. ~ewis' 
auditor \\'"as that this operation was similar to the Salt 
I.-lake City Lines as it was operating at that time. 
We submit that the evidence in the record does not 
Hustain any administrative construction at all which 
\Vould exempt the plaintiff herein from the collection and 
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payment of sales ta~ on its Ke~rns operations. Admit-
tedly, there has been a misunderstanding \Vhich has an 
a)pparent unfortunate result with regard t9.this particu-
lar taxpayer. However, mere hardship or misfortune 
does not and in fact cannot excuse the payment of taxes. 
Counsel for the plaintiff makes a somewhat lengthy 
co1nparison 'vith the operations of Airway Motor Lines 
and concludes, apparently from the testimony of Mr. 
Gibson, that Airway Motor Lines paid no tax and, there-
fore, the plaintiff should pay no tax. Considering the 
fact to be that Airway Motor Li~~s--p~id ~o tax, this in 
itself cannot and does not excuse -this taxpayer from pay-
ing the tax. Plaintiff recognizes that an erroneous con-
struction made by an administrative body- will not bt~ 
upheld and cites Hotel Utah v. Industrrial Commiss-ion, 
107 Utah 24, 151 Pac. 2d 467, and E. C. Olse__n Con~pany 
v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 587, 168 Pac. 
~2d 324. , ', l ;H.-t:"" • 
This court has considered the pro ble·m of administra-
tive construction many times and that ·portion of the ~j. 
C. Olsen case set forth in plaintiff's brief (P. 18) covers 
the rule quite well. Before there can he an administrative 
eonstruction of a statute or for that matter a judicial 
construction, the statute must be of such a nature that 1t 
is susceptible of construction. In this case we submit 
that the exemption from the collection cf sales tax on 
''street railvvay fares'' is not susceptible of construction 
a.nd that the exemption means "\\rhat it says. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
Therefore, we conclude and assert the fact to be 
that there is, in the first place, no sufficient evidence of 
ad1ninistrative construction of this exemption and, sec-
ondly, if the court should determine that there has ·been 
such administrative construction, that an interpretation 
of the statute 'vhich would hold ·a motorbus operation 
such as Le"yis Brothers Stages to be a ''street railway'' 
is out of harn1ony with the provision of the statute and 
cannot be given \veight, particularly in view of the fact 
that this is an exemption froni a' general taxing statute 
and n1ust be strictly construed against the tax;p.ayer. 
III. 
The Kearns operation complies with the valid tests 
no\v being applied by the Tax Commission as outlined in 
Exhibit A. 
This portion of plaintiff's brief is a· continuation 
of ·plaintiff's argument that there is an administrative 
construction of that portion of Title 80-15-4, . which 
exempts ''street railway fares.'' A compliance by a 
street transportation system of the tests set forth in 
Exhibit A would, it is admitted, constitute a "street 
rail\va.y. '' Plaintiff contends that only three of the. re-
quirements can be sustained and that No. 3 and No. 5 
are erroneous and that to require complete compliance 
was error. 
Requirement No. 5, which holds '' ( 5) Should operate 
'under permit or t~~anchise from city or municipal corpo-
ration," contemplates a type of street transportation sys-
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tern which does in fact require a franchise fron1 Salt Lake 
City Corporation. Plainti~.cites the case of Utah Light 
and Traction Company v. Public Serv·ice Comrnission, 
101 Utah 99, 110, 118 Pac. 2d 683, as holding ''they (fran-
chis.es) are required only in cases in which it is sought 
to impose upon the street a special burden which.cannot 
he imposed generally, that is, to burden the street \vith 
a special privilege which the public generally may not 
likevvise P-nj oy. A business such. -as that of the Airway~ 
does not so burden the street. It uses the streets only 
for the purpose of travel and transport and it is not 
subject to franchise requirements.'' Plaintiff concludes 
then that this requirement cannot be sustained where 
motor carriers are concerned. (Plaintiff's brief, P. 18) 
'Ve submit, however, that contrary to plaintiff's inter-
[pretation of this particular requirement that the infer-
ence is strong that motorbus operations such as the Lewis 
Brothers Stages cannot and do not qualify as a ''street 
raihvay. '' 
Distinguishing feature No.3 "Use of fare boxes" it 
is submitted is a valiq . test and, while not conclusive, is 
one factor which is considered by the Commission in 
determining vvhat constitutes a "street Railway" and 
we submit, while it is not of too much importance, the 
Commission found as a matter -of fact that the taxpayer 
had no regular fare boxes. (Findings of Fact No. 4 - R. 
69) 
Of the three remaining requirements, plaintiff con-
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cedes that they are proper factors to be considered and 
contends that the plaintiff's Kearns operation eoinplied 
\rith these requiren1ents. 
Test No. 4 ''frequency of Stops to ·pick up and de-
posit passengers along streets of city .and suburban 
areas." The crux of this test, it is submitted, and plain- . 
tiff's assertion that the Kearns ojperation meets such 
te8t, is based upon plaintiff's . basic theory ·that the 
I~ earns operation was an '' ext~nsion of street transpor-
tation service by an indep.enderit ·carrier''_ (Plaintiff ;s 
- -
Brief - P. 18) or "the- Kearns operation was only an 
integral part of an emergency street transportation sys-
tem in and_ about Salt Lake_ Cit~<' (~lai.ntiff'~ Brief -
P. 10) The frequency of stop 'te~3t, it is 'submitted, 're-
quires that the passenger service offered by the trans-
portation ~ystem is such that the inhabitant~ of a mu-
nicipality can pass from one point wrthin the municipal-
ity to another and frequent sto;pjs must be made for the 
purpose -of loading and discharging passengers. As 
heretofore pointed out, the !plaintiff's -~earns operation 
did not pick up and discharge passenge!s on its out-
going trip, nor did it pick up and discharge passengers 
on its in-bound trip. The evidence in the record clearly 
sho,vs that plaintiff's only authority and only m-ode of 
operation '"as to pick up passengers on the way out of 
Salt Lake City and to take these passengers to Kearns 
or, conver~ely, to 'pick up passengers at Kearns and de-
posit said passengers at various points within Salt Lake 
City. Plaintiff's operation did not meet the require-
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ment of frequency of stops to pick up and deposit pas-
sengers along the streets of Salt Lake City, or for that 
matter the suburban area surroundi~g Salt Lake City. 
The Findings of Fact No. 5 (R. 69) made by the Com-
mission should he sustained. 
Test No. 2 "Sale of tickets or passes· on cars and not 
from termina.ls'' we submit was .only partially complied 
\vith. Mr. Lewis, in his testimony (R. 63) testified that 
the tickets were sold at terminals and also that tickets 
were sold' on the buses. It is- submitted, in view of this 
testimony, that plaintiff's Kearns operation con1plied 
only :partially with such test, for the reason that they 
did maintain a ticket terminal. 
As to the remaining test as set forth in Exhibit 1.\ 
'' ( 1) street railway is intended for local convenience to 
facilitate transportation of persons from point to point 
w·ithin municipality or suburban districts,'' we contend 
that, unless the court adopts plaintiff's theory that their 
Kearns operation was an extension of a normal street 
transportation system, the operation totally fails to 
colllipJy with such test. The Kearns operation was in-
tended to facilitate transportation of persons from Salt 
Lake City to Kearns, Utah, and not \vithin the munici-
pality or within the suburban district. True it is that a 
minor ·portion of plaintiff's operation, conducted with 
the acquiescence of the Public Service Commission and 
its General Order No. 10, which applied to all carriers 
both interstate and intrastate (R. 39), might be inter-
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preted as a partial compliance with Test No. 1. How-
ever, it could as 'veil be applied to any intrastate car-
rier or to plaintiff's operations between Salt Lake City 
and Tooele, Bingham, etc. Such nominal comp~liance, we 
submit, does not establish a mode of operation on the 
part of plaintiff's Kearns operation which could he in-
terpreted as local transrportation from point to point 
'Yithin a mlmicipality. Plaintiff did not and could not 
operate within Salt Lake City.- l\ir. Hacking on cross 
examination testified as follows: (R. 37-38) 
Q. "Do you recall under the terms of that 
certificate, could Lewis Brothers Stages p~ick up 
passengers at their terminal in Salt Lake City, 
and discharge them on the outbound trip- at, s·ay, 
Fifth South? 
A. "No. 
r, Q. ''Could they discharge them, or what was 
their first discharge point on their out - going 
route? 
A. "Their discharge point on the written 
certificate was Kearns, on the pick-up going out. 
Q. "On the pick-up going out; they could 
not discharge passengers until they got to Kearns? 
A. ''That's right. 
Q. On the return trip, they could pick them 
up, I assume, anywhere within Kearns. Were 
there other places that they could pic~ up' 
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A. ''Well, no. Kearns was their origin ipoint 
on their return trip, the only origin point. 
Q. ''And they could discharge any place on 
the inbound trip within Salt Lake City; is that 
right? 
A. ''That is right.'' 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Commission, 
respectfully submits that, in view of the ·authorities cited 
and arguments presented herein, this court should deny 
plaintiff's claim that the fares collected were exempt as 
being ''str-eet railway'' fares, pursuant to the provisions 
of Title 80-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
Defendant further submits that no administrative 
construction has been established by the record -in this 
case by reason of which it can be claimed that the plain-
tiff's fares were exempt, or if such administrative con-
struction can be said to have been established, then the 
conclusion must be, we submit, that such interpretation 
was erroneous and cannot be given ~eight. 
The plaintiff herein was not a ''street railway'' and 
the fares collected were not ''street railway fares.'' 
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WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the decision 
heretofore rendered in this matter be affirmed and judg-
ment rendered accordingly. 
Resp~ectfully submitted, 
G. HAL TAYLOR, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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